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This paper develops a model of the WTO dispute settlement process (DSP) to study the
recent proposal by legal scholars to subsidize litigation costs. The high cost of litigation,
so the argument, is a major obstacle for developing countries to using the DSP to enforce
developed countries’ compliance with WTO rules. The paper shows that this proposal may
be misguided. In particular, a reduction of litigation costs may lead large countries to impose
larger trade impediments where before they may have raised barriers only a little. Thus, a
cost reduction may even weaken the smaller countries’ position in the DSP. Moreover, the
model sheds light on the structure of the dark ﬁgure of un-accused oﬀenses, suggesting that
the observed record of disputes notiﬁed to the WTO is systematically biased.
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suggestions.1 Introduction
An essential change in the course of the transformation of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs
and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was the institutional-
ization of a Dispute Settlement System (DSS). From 1995 until the end of 2005 there were
335 disputes notiﬁed to the WTO, consisting of 368 individual countries’ complaints. The
major share of these complaints (222) was ﬁled by high income countries and against high
income countries (235), while there have been only 22 complaints and 21 defences by low-
income countries.1 This extremely asymmetric usage of the DSS has been traced back to
an institutional bias of the DSS by scholars from the ﬁelds economics, law and politics. A
prominent proposal to overcome this supposed bias of the DSS is a reduction of litigation
costs.2
Apart from the cost reduction proposal, the supposed bias of the DSP as such is analyzed
in this paper. Some empirical studies have already examined whether or not the unbalanced-
ness of the record of disputes with respect to income groups indicates a systematic bias of
the DSS against poorer countries. In the pioneer paper by [Horn et al., 1999] the hypothesis
that a dispute in a given bilateral product-market-pairing (PMP) occurs randomly is tested
empirically. The PMP-approach explains the observed pattern of disputes quite accurately,
since bigger and richer countries with more PMPs are supposed to be involved in more
disputes than smaller and poorer countries with less PMPs. Another empirical paper by
[Guzman and Simmons, 2005] analyzes the pattern of disputes in terms of the complainants’
and respondents’ GDP. The authors reject the “power hypothesis” which “...predicts that
countries will ﬁle fewer complaints if they are poor and politically weak than if they are rich
and politically powerful.”3.
Although these empirical ﬁndings basically reject the hypothesis of a biased system,
there is reason to believe that an institutional bias exists, even if it does not show up in
the data. It is a known result in trade theory that a larger country may improve its welfare
1The ﬁgures on the notiﬁed disputes are taken from the author’s own dataset, which is based on the record of
disputes on the WTO’s website. Income classiﬁcations of countries correspond to the Worldbank’s classiﬁcation
scheme.
2The proposals include legal assistance, ﬁnancial assistance and the introduction of procedurally simpliﬁed
“Small Claims” proceedings for complaints of minor value. See for example [Busch and Reinhardt, 2003] and
[Footer, 2001]
3[Guzman and Simmons, 2005], page 559.
1by oﬀending a trade agreement with a smaller trading partner, even if the smaller country
retaliates.4 Moreover, it is an empirically supported thesis that poor countries face higher
costs associated with the preparation of a complaint than rich countries do.5 In the light
of just these two arguments it should already become questionable that the observed record
of disputes is generated by an unbiased random process. As a matter of fact, up to now
there is no information on the dark ﬁgure of disputes, which are those cases where a country
experienced a violation but did not report it to the WTO. [Guzman and Simmons, 2005]
conclude: “In the absence of a clear sense of how many cases developing countries ‘ought
to’ have initiated, we really do not know whether these ﬁled cases represent equal access or
not.”6. Therefore, empirical approaches that try to shed light on the question of a systemic
bias seem to be a dead end.
Theory on trade agreements is dominated by the employment of an inﬁnitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game in order to explain a country’s incentive to comply with, or to oﬀend
against a trade agreement.7 The common ground of these models is the assumption that
an oﬀense by one of the trading partners leads to non-cooperative behavior of both trading
partners in each of the following periods. As a consequence existing trade agreements are
assumed and required to be self-enforcing, such that the afore mentioned trigger strategy
successfully deters countries from defecting.8 Thus, in contrast to reality, violation and
retaliation remain oﬀ-equilibrium-path strategies in these models.
All in all, existing empirical studies’ inference is likely to be based on a systematically
biased set of observations, while existing theory does not provide any explanation for the
occurrence of disputes if one leaves alone the idea that policymakers may be possessed by a
“demon” who leads them to irrational behavior from time to time.9
In order to be able to (i) explain the occurrence of trade disputes and (ii) analyze the
4A classic reference is “Do Big Countries Win Tariﬀ Wars?” by [Kennan and Riezman, 1988].
5See [Bown, 2005], [Guzman and Simmons, 2005] and [Busch and Reinhardt, 2003] who argue that costs play
an important role in the poorer countries’ decision whether or not to ﬁle a complaint. See [Footer, 2001] for a
verbal analysis.
6[Guzman and Simmons, 2005], page 591.
7[Bagwell and Staiger, 1999] use a two country approach. [Maggi, 1999] uses a three country approach of the
described fashion.
8[Bagwell and Staiger, 2002], page 99, believe:“The fundamental deterrent to such behavior, and the deterrent
that therefore rests at the foundation of all others, is the fear of initiating a breakdown in the entire cooperative
arrangement and thereby causing a ‘trade war’.”.
9See [Kovenock and Thursby, 1992].
2eﬀects of the proposed reduction of litigation costs this paper takes a diﬀerent slant by
providing an explicit model of the DSP. The regulations of the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU), which governs the rules of retaliation, are taken at face value and applied to
a two country tariﬀ setting game. In this setup violation does not necessarily have to be an
oﬀ-equilibrium strategy. It rather depends upon a country’s relative size and the pertinent
level of litigation costs whether or not a trade agreement is violated, and whether or not the
oﬀended country decides to ﬁle a costly complaint.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts by presenting the
underlying two country trading environment. After a brief setup of the model’s fundamental
equations, the rules of the sequential tariﬀ setting game are introduced. The setup is com-
pleted by modeling the WTO’s provisions of retaliation. Subsequently the game is solved
via backward induction, and best response functions are derived. The equilibria of the game
are presented as functions of country size and litigation costs. Moreover, the proposal of a
reduction of litigation costs is examined in a comparative static analysis. In section 4 the
robustness of the results is veriﬁed in the course of an extension of the basic model. Finally
section 5 summarizes the results, establishes links to empirical studies in support of the
results and points out implications for the dark ﬁgure of disputes.
2 The Model
The analysis is based on a trade model with two countries (Home and Foreign) and three
goods (x, y and z), which allows for diﬀerent country or market sizes. The underlying utility
functions are assumed to be quasilinear in both countries: U[x,y,z] = z + ux[x] + uy[y].
While ux[·] and uy[·] are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utility, z is assumed to be
a numeraire good with price pz ﬁxed at unity. Trade in the numeraire good is assumed to
be determined residually by the condition of balanced trade.
For the sake of simplicity of the economic arguments, a simple model, where both coun-
tries diﬀer only in their demand for one of the two non-numeraire goods, is analyzed at ﬁrst.
In section 4 the analysis is extended to a more cumbersome model, where demand for both
non-numeraire goods is aﬀected in order to account for country size diﬀerences.
32.1 Setup of the Trading Environment
















b. Since all parameters are assumed to be positive, Home receives
more (less) utility from the consumption of good x than Foreign if n is larger (smaller)
than unity. An alternative way to think of the setup of this basic model is to assume two
diﬀerent types of consumers in each country. Consumers of type x only derive utility from
the consumption of good x and the numeraire good, whereas consumers of type y only derive
utility from the consumption of good y and the numeraire good. Assume then that Home
has n consumers of type x, while Foreign has one consumer of type x and that there is one
consumer of type y in each country. Home’s demand functions for good x and y are given
by:
Dx[px] := (a − bpx)n (1)
Dy[py] := a − bpy (2)
Foreign’s demand functions for good x and y are given by:
D∗
x[px] := a − bpx (3)
D∗
y[py] := a − bpy (4)
While both countries have a positive demand for both good x and good y, good x is produced
only in Foreign, whereas good y is produced only at Home10:
S∗
x[px] := bpx (5)
Sy[py] := bpy (6)
Consequently, Home becomes a net importer of good x and a net exporter of good y, while
Foreign becomes a net importer of good y and a net exporter of good x. Note that the two
10The underlying production functions are assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to scale. The production
functions for x and y are given by x[l] =
√
2bl and y[l] =
√
2bl respectively, where l denotes any input factor.
4countries are symmetric except for the multiplicative parameter n, which represents the size
of the home market demand for good x. For n = 1 the two countries would be completely
symmetric, while for n > 1, (n < 1) it holds that Home’s import demand is larger, (smaller)
than Foreign’s import demand.
By assumption, each country’s sole policy variable is a per unit import tariﬀ on its import
good. Home’s import tariﬀ on good x is denoted by τ, while Foreign’s import tariﬀ on good
y is denoted by τ∗. After the introduction of tariﬀs the demand functions for each country’s
import good are Dx[px] := (a−b(px+τ))n and D∗
y[py] := a−b(py+τ∗), respectively. Market





Solving for px and py yields equilibrium world market prices as functions of the associated
import tariﬀs.11 Substituting the equilibrium prices into each country’s demand and supply
functions yields the equilibrium quantities as functions of the import tariﬀs.12
Welfare Considerations








2b(2+n)2 . Home’s tariﬀ revenue is simply equilibrium demand multiplied by τ
yielding b trx[τ] =
nτ(a−2bτ)
2+n . Thus, Home’s equilibrium welfare in sector x can be expressed
as a function of its import tariﬀ τ and the market size parameter n:
ˆ wx[τ,n] =
n(a − 2bτ)(a + 2b(1 + n)τ)
2b(2 + n)2 (7)
Home’s consumer surplus in sector y is given by csy[py] =
R a
b
py Dy[py]dpy. Substituting for py





Producer surplus of Home’s exporting industry is psy[py] =
R py
0 Sy[py]dpy. Substituting




18b . Thus, Home’s equilibrium welfare in sector y can be expressed as a function
11See Mathematical Appendix 6.1.
12Note that all equilibrium values will be labeled with a hat in the following.







− 2aτ∗ + 2bτ∗2) (8)
Home’s aggregated equilibrium welfare is simply the sum of welfare in both sectors and








− 2aτ∗ + 2bτ∗2) +
n(a − 2bτ)(a + 2b(1 + n)τ)
2b(2 + n)2 (9)
Foreign’s aggregated equilibrium welfare is obtained in an analogous manner. It is as well a
function of Home’s import tariﬀ τ, Foreign’s import tariﬀ τ∗ and the market size parameter
n:
ˆ w∗[τ,τ∗,n] =
a2 + 2abτ∗ − 8b2τ∗2
18b
+
a2(2 + 2n + n2) − 2abn2τ + 2b2n2τ2
2b(2 + n)2 (10)
Both aggregated welfare functions are concave in each country’s own tariﬀ and decreasing
in the other country’s tariﬀ.13 A unilaterally welfare-maximizing tariﬀ will be referred to as
an “optimal tariﬀ”. The pair of optimal tariﬀs τo and τ∗










While Foreign’s optimal tariﬀ is a constant, Home’s optimal tariﬀ is an increasing function
of its own market size n.14 This dependency stems from the increasing ability to inﬂuence
the terms-of-trade in one’s favor with increasing market size. From the equations above it
is obvious that Home’s optimal tariﬀ will be lower, (higher) than Foreign’s optimal tariﬀ if
n < 1, (n > 1).
Note that up to now all welfare components of sector x only depend on changes of Home’s
policy variable τ, while all welfare components of sector y react to changes of Foreign’s policy





4b(1+n)2 is always positive.
6variable τ∗. As a consequence each country is vulnerable in its export sector, while it can
harm the other country by restricting access to its own import sector. Interaction between
the tariﬀ choices of both countries will now be established by means of a sequential game.
2.2 Trade Disputes as Sequential Games
Thinking of the two countries as any two WTO members that are involved in bilateral trade,
it is reasonable to assume these countries have committed themselves to some kind of trade
agreement. For simplicity, it is assumed that the two countries have committed themselves
to an initial free trade agreement, which implies that both τ and τ∗ have to be equal to zero
in order to fulﬁll the agreement. Under such a type of agreement, countries could be tempted
to violate the agreement by a unilateral increase of the import tariﬀ in order to beneﬁt from
an increase in their own welfare.15
Let Home be the ﬁrst mover in this sequential game. Then Home will decide whether to
violate the agreement to a certain extent, by raising its tariﬀ above the allowed level, or to
comply with the agreement. Foreign, being the second mover, observes the choice of the ﬁrst
mover. In case the ﬁrst mover violates the agreement, the second mover can choose between
doing nothing and ﬁling a complaint at costs c at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in
order to be entitled to retaliate against Home.16
Although the typical dispute settlement process consists of multiple stages, starting with
a request for consultations, via the ruling of panel and appellate body, up to the request for
the suspension of concessions, in this model it is reduced to a single decision of the second
mover (to complain or not to complain).17
15A typical WTO example for such a situation would be any WTO member’s obligation to grant every trading
partner an import tariﬀ that is lower than or equal to its Most-Favored-Nation import tariﬀ, while at the same
time this particular member possibly would like to discriminate among its trading partners by setting diﬀerent
import tariﬀs.
16Litigation costs can be thought of as to incorporate the direct monetary costs of hiring a law ﬁrm or a
consulting company in the course of the preparation of the complaint as well as the loss of political goodwill
of the trading partner. [Nordstr¨ om, 2005] emphasizes the role of direct monetary litigation costs and provides
empirical data on its composition.
17This simpliﬁcation of the legal process is achieved by assuming (i) the presence of perfect information, (ii)
perfect monitoring and (iii) absence of legal failure. While perfect monitoring means that a violation of the trade
agreement will always be detected by the harmed victim, the absence of legal failure means that the panel judges
every violation to be a violation.
7Linking First and Second Mover
The DSU states that “[t]he level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations au-
thorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nulliﬁcation or the impairment.”
18.
While the exact method of calculating the level of nulliﬁcation or impairment is left to
the discretion of the ruling panel, legal practice is dominated by a counterfactual trade value
approach.19 The trade value approach simply compares price times quantity of the traded
good before and after the disputable trade measure. The diﬀerence between these two trade
values is seen as the level of nulliﬁcation or impairment suﬀered by the complainant. Or, in
terms of the model at hand, the damage to the second mover.
The trade value of Home’s import good tvx[τ], is simply Home’s import demand times the
equilibrium world market price: tvx[τ] := (Dx[ˆ px[τ] + τ])ˆ px[τ]. Consequently, the change in
the trade value due to an increase in Home’s import tariﬀ is given by ∆tvx[τ] := (Dx[ˆ px[τ]+
τ])ˆ px[τ] − (Dx[ˆ px[0] + 0])ˆ px[0]. In this model the expression becomes:
∆tvx[τ] =
nτ(−a(2 + 3n) + 2bnτ)
(2 + n)2 (13)
The change in trade value of the foreign import good ∆tvy[τ∗] is obtained by similar means:
∆tvy[τ∗] := (Dy
∗[ˆ py[τ∗] + τ∗])ˆ py[τ∗] − (Dy





τ∗(−5a + 2bτ∗) (14)
The equivalence condition cited above requires that the retaliative distortion of the trade
value has to be less than or equal to the distortion that was caused by the initial violation.
This condition holds if ∆tvy[τ∗] ≤ ∆tvx[τ]. Solving this expression for τ∗ yields Foreign’s
maximum retaliative tariﬀ as a function of Home’s violative tariﬀ τ and the market size ratio
18DSU Article 22, para 4.
19See [Jordan, 2005], pages 119-124 for a discussion of the employed calculation methods. The dominating
method used in this paper was employed for example in the following cases: WT/DS26 EC-Hormones, WT/DS27
EC-Bananas, WT/DS160 US-Copyright.




5a(2 + n) −
p
25a2(2 + n)2 − 72abn(2 + 3n)τh + 144b2n2τ2
4b(2 + n)
(15)
The Dispute Settlement System’s equivalence condition thus creates a strategic link between
Home’s violative tariﬀ on imports of good x and the Foreign’s retaliative tariﬀ on imports
of good y.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Due to the assumption of perfect information the subgame perfect equilibrium tariﬀs are
found by backward induction, starting with Foreign as the second mover.
3.1 The Second Mover’s Equilibrium Strategy
For a given violation of the initial free trade agreement (i.e. τ > 0) Foreign has to make
two decisions. First, how much to retaliate within the permitted interval 0 ≤ τ∗
r ≤ τ∗
eq.
Second, whether or not to ﬁle a complaint at costs c in order to be entitled to retaliate with
a retaliative tariﬀ τ∗
r .
3.1.1 The Optimal Retaliative Tariﬀ
Earlier calculations have shown that Foreign would maximize its welfare by setting its optimal
tariﬀ τ∗
o = a
8b if it faced an unrestricted optimization problem.20 However, if the equivalence
condition restricts Foreign’s retaliation to a level below τ∗
o, Foreign will completely exploit
the admissible retaliation tariﬀ and set its retaliative tariﬀ τ∗
r equal to τ∗
eq[τ,n]. In short,
Foreign’s retaliative tariﬀ τ∗
r is given by:
τ∗
r [τ,n] = min{τ∗
o,τ∗
eq[τ,n]} (16)
20Since Foreign’s welfare is a continuous function of its import tariﬀ τ
∗, which is strictly increasing on the
interval between zero and τ
∗
o, it follows that Foreign’s welfare-maximizing retaliative tariﬀ τ
∗
r has an upper bound
at its optimal tariﬀ τ
∗
o.
93.1.2 To Retaliate or not to Retaliate
After the extent of Foreign’s retaliation has been determined, the question of whether or not
Foreign will retaliate at all remains to be analyzed.
Necessary Condition for Retaliation
Since Foreign is an importer of good y, the analysis of Foreign’s retaliation decision and For-
eign’s associated possible welfare gains can be restricted to sector y. Foreign will retaliate
whenever the welfare gain in sector y due to retaliation is higher than litigation costs (i.e.
ˆ w∗
y[τ∗
r [τ,n]]− ˆ w∗
y[0] > c has to hold). Since the maximum achievable welfare gain in sector y
is realized when Foreign implements τ∗
o as its retaliative tariﬀ, it follows that litigation costs
are prohibitively high if c ≥ ˆ w∗
y[τ∗
o] − ˆ w∗
y[0] holds. This condition states that litigation costs
are prohibitive whenever welfare from complaining and retaliating is lower than welfare from
doing nothing, even though the complainant is entitled to set its optimal tariﬀ. The conse-
quence of such prohibitively high litigation costs would be a breakdown of the strategic link
between Home’s and Foreign’s actions.21 Therefore, the remainder of the analysis focuses
on the case of non-prohibitive costs, such that c < cp holds, where cp stands for prohibitive
costs.22 Note that the prohibitive level of litigation costs is independent of market size in
the current model. Since the market size of Foreign is normalized to one, cp is a constant
and it is possible to express litigation costs more conveniently as a fraction of prohibitive
costs. Deﬁne c := γcp, then γ = c
cp displays present costs as a fraction of prohibitive costs.
It follows that γ < 1 is a necessary condition for Foreign to retaliate.
Suﬃcient Condition for Retaliation
While Foreign’s litigation costs are exogenously determined, the admissible level of Foreign’s
retaliative tariﬀ τ∗
eq[τ,n] depends positively upon the market size ratio n and the level of
Home’s initial violation τ. In other words, the larger the oﬀending country’s market relative
to the oﬀended country’s market and the more severe the oﬀense, the higher will be the level
21Due to perfect information, Home anticipates that Foreign is not retaliating when costs are prohibitive.
Therefore, Home would always play its optimal tariﬀ while Foreign would never retaliate.
22In the model at hand cp is given by cp =
a2
144b.
10of permitted retaliation according to the equivalence condition.23 As a consequence, there
will be a vector of combinations of γ, n and τ that leads Foreign to be indiﬀerent between
retaliating and not retaliating. Since the model has tariﬀs as strategic instruments, it is
convenient to express the locus of Foreign’s indiﬀerence in terms of Home’s tariﬀ τ. Setting
Foreign’s welfare gain from retaliation equal to litigation costs (c = ˆ w∗
y[τ∗
r [τ,n]]− ˆ w∗
y[0]), one
can solve for Home’s tariﬀ, that leads Foreign to be indiﬀerent between retaliating and not
retaliating, as a function of γ and n. This indiﬀerence-inducing tariﬀ of Home is denoted as
τi[γ,n] in the following.
τi[γ,n] =
a(12 + 18n −
p
18(4 + n(20 + 17n)) + 18(2 + n)2√
1 − γ − (2 + n)2γ)
24bn
The n-τ-space in Figure 1 is intersected by two indiﬀerence curves. The upper curve repre-
sents the case of prohibitive costs (i.e. γ1 = 1). The lower curve represents a case of γ < 1.
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will retaliate (i.e. τ > τi[γ,n]) and a southwestern set of locations, where Foreign will not
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11retaliate (i.e. τ ≤ τi[γ,n]).
The ﬁgure reveals that Foreign’s retaliation threshold is lower, the lower the level of
litigation costs. It also shows that n and τ are “substitutes” from the perspective of Foreign,
who is eventually interested in the level of admissible retaliation. In other words, a Home
country with a small market, raising its import tariﬀ steeply, could result in the same ∆tvx
(which translates into the admissible retaliation tariﬀ) as a Home country with a large market
which raises its import tariﬀ only slightly.
3.1.3 Intermediate Results





0, iﬀ τ ≤ τi[γ,n]
τ∗
r [n,τ], iﬀ τ > τi[γ,n]
(17)
3.2 The First Mover’s Equilibrium Strategy
3.2.1 General Considerations
Home sets its tariﬀ, anticipating the consequences of doing so in terms of whether or not
there will be any retaliation and in terms of the extent of a possible retaliation. Note that
Home’s welfare as a function of its import tariﬀ τ is no longer a continuous function, not even
for the set of non-prohibitive tariﬀs. Home’s welfare will now have a step at the point where
Foreign switches between retaliating and not retaliating due to an incremental increase in
Home’s oﬀense. Therefore, one has to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether
Foreign retaliates or not. In the following, oﬀenses triggering retaliation (i.e. τ > τi[γ,n])
will be referred to as major oﬀenses, while smaller levels of violation which do not trigger
retaliation (i.e. 0 < τ ≤ τi[γ,n]) will be referred to as minor oﬀenses.
Given Foreign retaliates with its retaliative tariﬀ τ∗
r [τ,n], this will decrease Home’s welfare
in its exporting sector y. Therefore, Home will raise its own import tariﬀ only as long as
the marginal beneﬁt accruing in sector x is larger than the marginal loss in sector y due
to foreign retaliation. Home’s welfare, given Foreign retaliates, is found by substituting
12Foreign’s retaliative tariﬀ τ∗
r [τ,n] = min{τ∗
o,τ∗
eq[τ,n]} into Home’s welfare function:













The ﬁrst case can be ruled out to occur for n < 1.24 The welfare-maximizing tariﬀ is denoted
by τma[n] in the following.25 τma[n] can be shown to exhibit the following properties:26
τma[n]

     
     
< 0, iﬀ n < 1
= 0, iﬀ n = 1
> 0, iﬀ n > 1
(19)
The basic message from this result is that it does not pay for a country to commit a major
oﬀense against a country with a larger import market. This result can be explained by the
fact that the global deadweight loss, arising from the trade war, is split unevenly between
the two countries, with the smaller country bearing the larger part of it.
3.2.2 Identifying Sets of Dominated Strategies
Consider Figure 2. The bold indiﬀerence curve represents τi[γ,n] for prohibitive costs (i.e.
γ1), while the thin indiﬀerence curve represents γ < 1. The dashed upward sloping curve
depicts Home’s optimal tariﬀ.
I. Clearly all combinations of τ and n located above Home’s optimal tariﬀ can be excluded
from further analysis for the simple reason that the choice of all these locations is strictly
dominated by choosing τo[n].
II. There is a second strictly dominated set of tariﬀs, which can be excluded from further
analysis as well. Consider those cases where τ < τo[n]∧τ < τi[γ,n]. For all tariﬀs located in




o implies that the distortion in trade value due to Home’s initial oﬀense has to be
greater than the distortion in trade value that would result from foreign retaliation, even if Foreign plays its
optimal tariﬀ, which is
a
8b. Suppose for the moment that the market size ratio is smaller than unity. Then Home’s
optimal tariﬀ which is τo[n] =
an
4b+4bn would fall short of Foreign’s optimal tariﬀ. But in order to cause a trade
value distortion that translates into a foreign tariﬀ of at least
a
8b, Home would have to raise its tariﬀ above its
optimal tariﬀ, which is a strictly dominated strategy.
25The subscript ma should remind the reader of the fact that this tariﬀ is associated with a major oﬀense.
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this set Home could raise its tariﬀ, thereby getting closer to its optimal tariﬀ, without any
negative eﬀects since Foreign would only retaliate if the retaliation threshold was exceeded.
Hence this set of tariﬀs is strictly dominated by playing τi[γ,n].
III. Yet another set of tariﬀs is strictly dominated. Consider the set of tariﬀs where τ < τo[n]∧
τ > τi[γ1,n] and recall that τi[γ1,n] is the set of n-τ-combinations that entitles Foreign to
retaliate exactly with its optimal tariﬀ τ∗
o = a
8b. Hence, any n-τ-combinations located above
τi[γ1,n] trigger the same amount of retaliation since Foreign’s maximum retaliative capacity
is already exhausted. While triggering the same punishment, these n-τ-combinations increase
Home’s welfare the more, the closer they are to its optimal tariﬀ τo[n]. Therefore, all these
n-τ-combinations are strictly dominated by playing τo[n].
3.2.3 Best Responses
Best Response for n ≤ 1
Home would choose to play its optimal tariﬀ τo[n] up to the market size of noi[γ],27 which
corresponds to the point labeled A. Home countries with markets larger than noi[γ] but still
27The subscript “oi” should remind the reader of the fact that noi denotes the critical market size where Home
switches from playing τo[n] to playing τi[γ,n]. The existence and the properties of this lower switching point
noi[γ] are examined in the Mathematical Appendix 6.4.
14smaller than unity will choose to play τi[γ,n].
Note for the moment that the smallest countries (i.e. n ≤ noi[γ]) can play their optimal
tariﬀ without harming their trading partners enough to trigger a complaint, while slightly
larger countries (i.e. n > noi[γ]), still being smaller than their trading partners, have to
discipline their oﬀenses to a level below their optimal tariﬀ in order not to exceed the re-
taliation threshold τi[γ,n], since committing major oﬀenses has been shown to be a strictly
dominated strategy for n < 1.
Best Response for n > 1
In those cases where Home’s market is larger than Foreign’s (i.e. n > 1), the best response
function is obtained by a somewhat more complex analysis than for the cases of n ≤ 1,
because now the option of committing a major oﬀense may be proﬁtable for Home. After
having identiﬁed three strictly dominated sets of tariﬀs for n > 1 in the preceding para-
graphs, one has to analyze whether Home’s best response will be either to choose its tariﬀ
to equal
1. its optimal tariﬀ τo[n],
2. the current retaliation threshold τi[γ,n] or
3. some tariﬀ τma[n] between τi[γ,n] and τi[γ1,n].
Note that option 1 will trigger ﬁxed retaliation of τ∗
o = a
8b, while option 2 will trigger no
retaliation at all, and option 3 will trigger retaliation of τ∗
eq[τ,n], which is elastic in the
magnitude of the initial oﬀense.
Welfare from option 1 will be denoted by ˆ wo[n].28 It is obtained by substituting τo[n] for
τ and τ∗
o for τ∗ into Home’s welfare function:
ˆ wo[n] := ˆ wx[τo[n],n] + ˆ wy[τ∗
o] (20)
Welfare from option 2 will be denoted by ˆ wi[γ,n]. It is obtained by substituting τi[γ,n] for
28For ˆ wo[n], it can be shown that
∂ ˆ wo[n]
∂n > 0 and
∂2 ˆ wo[n]
∂2n < 0. See Mathematical Appendix 6.5.
15τ and 0 for τ∗ into Home’s welfare function:
ˆ wi[γ,n] := ˆ wx[τi[γ,n],n] + ˆ wy[0] (21)
Welfare from option 3 will be denoted by ˆ wma[n]. It is obtained by substituting τma[n] for
τ and τ∗
eq[τma[n],n]29 for τ∗ into Home’s welfare function:
ˆ wma[n] := ˆ wx[τma[n]] + ˆ wy[τ∗
eq[τma[n],n]] (22)
Home’s welfare under these three alternative strategies is depicted in Figure 3. The dashed
curve represents ˆ wo[n], which is Home’s welfare when both Home and Foreign play their op-
timal tariﬀs. The dotted curve represents ˆ wma[n], which is Home’s welfare from committing
an oﬀense given Foreign retaliates elastically. The three continuous curves represent ˆ wi[γ,n]
for diﬀerent cost-levels. The upper bold continuous curve is associated with prohibitive costs
(i.e. γ1). The lower bold continuous curve is associated with zero costs (i.e. γ0 = 0), while
the ﬁner continuous curve in the middle represents intermediate costs of 0 < γ < 1.30
Suppose for the moment that costs were ﬁxed at some level where 0 < γ < 1. Then
Home’s best response depends solely on its size. Home countries being only slightly larger
than Foreign (n < nio[γ])31 would avoid any retaliation and violate the agreement only by
τi[γ,n]. This can be seen from Figure 3 since for Home countries being smaller than nio[γ]
the ﬁne continuous curve yields the highest welfare level. Home countries being suﬃciently
large (i.e. n > nio[γ]) will play their optimal tariﬀ and take Foreign’s retaliation into account.
The economic reason for this behavior can be explained by considering the right hand side
of Figure 2 (i.e. n > 1) again. Note that the gap between τi[γ,n] and τo[n] widens with
increasing market size. This means that the opportunity cost of playing the threshold tariﬀ
τi[γ,n] is increasing in n since τi[γ,n] is decreasing in n while τo[n] is increasing in n.
Consequently, there is a switching point in terms of n where Home’s opportunity costs of
29Earlier it was argued that it is a dominant strategy for Home to play its optimal tariﬀ τo[n] given that Foreign
already plays its optimal tariﬀ τ
∗. Therefore, the case in which Home plays τma[n] given that Foreign plays τ
∗
o
can be excluded from the analysis.
30Note that costs are a shift parameter of ˆ wi[γ,n], while ˆ wo[n] and ˆ wma[n] are independent of costs.
31The subscript “io” should remind the reader of the fact that nio denotes the critical country size where Home
switches from playing τi[γ,n] to playing τo[n].
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cost-elastic range
avoiding retaliation will equal Home’s costs from taking retaliation into account. At this
point Home will switch from playing τi[γ,n] to playing τo[n].32
Due to the assumption of non-negative and non-prohibitive costs, the location of this
higher switching point will always lie between the ﬁxed values of nio[γ0] = 1.38504 and
nio[γ1] = 2.46187.33
Figure 3 already suggests that playing τma[n] will be an inferior choice for most levels of
litigation costs. Since the aﬀected set of n-γ-combinations is very small and the implemented
tariﬀ level τma[n] as well as the associated welfare level ˆ wma[n] are extremely close to τi[γ,n]
and ˆ wi[γ,n] in this particular region, further analysis of this option is omitted.34
32The existence and the properties of this higher switching point nio[γ] are examined in the Mathematical
Appendix 6.7.
33The numerical value of nio[γ0] is obtained by setting ˆ wo[n] equal to ˆ wi[γ0,n] and solving for n. The numerical
value of nio[γ1] is obtained by setting ˆ wo[n] equal to ˆ wi[γ1,n] and solving for n.
34For the sake of completeness it has to be stated that the ﬁrst mover will only play τma[n] if it holds both that
γ ≤ 0.03086 and 1 < n ≤ 1.40231. See Mathematical Appendix 6.6.
173.2.4 Intermediate Results
Home’s best response ˆ τ is given by:
ˆ τ =

     
     
τo[n], if n > nio[γ]
τi[γ,n], iﬀ noi[γ] < n ≤ nio[γ]
τo[n], if n ≤ noi[γ]
(23)
Stated verbally:
1. The biggest Home countries will play their optimal tariﬀs and take Foreign’s retaliation
into account.
2. Home countries of intermediate market size will restrict their tariﬀ to a level below
their optimal tariﬀ in order to avoid retaliation by bothering Foreign no more than the
latter’s tolerance level.
3. The smallest Home countries will play their optimal tariﬀ because they do not cause
enough damage to trigger retaliation.
3.3 Equilibria
Both Home’s and Foreign’s best response functions are conditional on n and the level of
litigation costs. Therefore the pair of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium tariﬀs (ˆ τ; ˆ τ∗) is
dependent upon the exogenously determined levels of γ and n. Figure 4 shows that the γ-n-
space is divided into three large and one negligible small area of diﬀerent equilibria.35 The
grey area in the northwest of Figure 4 represents a trade war between the two countries, where
each country is playing its optimal tariﬀ. This type of equilibrium occurs predominantly if
Home is large enough to put up with Foreign’s retaliation. It is bordered below by nio[γ].
The white area in the center of Figure 4 represents the equilibria, in which one country
bothers the other country just so much that retaliation is avoided. The economic intuition
for the existence of this type of equilibrium is that either Home countries are too small to
be willing to put up with retaliation, or Home’s opportunity costs of a minor oﬀense36 are
35See preceding footnote.
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relatively low, which is the case if litigation costs are relatively high. This type of equilibrium
is bordered above by nio[γ] and below by noi[γ]. Note that both afore-mentioned types of
equilibria only exist for non-prohibitive costs. The striped area, which stretches at the
bottom and along the right edge of Figure 4 represents the set of equilibria where Home
plays its optimal tariﬀ, while Foreign does not retaliate. This type of equilibrium occurs if
either Home’s market is so small that Foreign is not harmed enough in order to be willing to
pay litigation costs (the cases at the bottom) or costs are prohibitive (the cases at the right
edge where γ ≥ 1 holds).
3.4 Comparative Statics in Litigation Costs
After having computed the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ pairs as functions of country size and
litigation costs, it is possible to ﬁnally analyze the eﬀects of a reduction of litigation costs
by consulting Figure 4 again. It is useful to distinguish between a cost reduction that passes
the threshold of prohibitive costs on the one hand and a cost reduction that occurs within
the range of non-prohibitive costs on the other hand.
193.4.1 Prohibitive Initial Costs
Consider the case where initial litigation costs are prohibitive (i.e. γ ≥ 1). Then the initial
equilibrium tariﬀ pair is given by (τo[n];0), with the Home playing its optimal tariﬀ and
Foreign not retaliating at all. The eﬀects of a reduction of litigation costs to a level just an
increment below the prohibitive threshold of γ = 1 are dependent upon the pertinent level
of n.
The tariﬀ of a large Home country with n > nio[γ] is left unchanged, although Foreign
implements retaliation of τ∗
o.
In the case of an intermediate size Home country with noi[γ] < n ≤ nio[γ] compliance is
improved since the post shock tariﬀ pair is (τi[γ,n];0).
In the case of a small Home country with n ≤ noi[γ] both countries’ tariﬀs and welfare
levels are left unchanged.
3.4.2 Non-prohibitive Initial Costs
Now consider the case where initial non-prohibitive litigation costs (i.e. γ < 1) are further
reduced.
For high values of n, where the initial set of equilibrium tariﬀs is (τo[n];τ∗
o), a reduction
of litigation costs will have no eﬀect at all, and the equilibrium does not change.
Suppose the initial equilibrium set of tariﬀs was (τi[γ,n];0), which corresponds to any
location inside the white area in the center of Figure 4. In this case the eﬀects depend even
further on n. If n ≤ nio[γ0],37 the reduction in litigation costs does not change the equi-
librium strategies as such since the post shock equilibrium strategies are again (τi[γ,n];0).
Nevertheless, Home will set a lower tariﬀ because the absolute level of τi[γ,n] has been re-
duced in the course of the cost reduction. However, if n > nio[γ0],38 the cost reduction may
change the equilibrium, such that Home commits a more severe oﬀense by switching to its
optimal tariﬀ τo[n] thereby triggering retaliation of Foreign, who switches to its own optimal
tariﬀ τ∗
o. The ﬁnding that a reduction of litigation costs may lead to more severe oﬀenses,
although the cost reduction succeeds in rendering retaliation more attractive, might seem
37Recall that nio[γ0] is equal to 1.38504 and therefore independent of any values of parameters and variables.
38See preceding footnote.
20paradoxical at ﬁrst sight, but it becomes clear upon closer investigation.39 Note that this
paradoxical eﬀect only occurs for oﬀenders with markets of larger size than the ones of their
victims (i.e. nio[γ0] = 1.38504 < n ≤ 2.46187 = nio[γ1]).
Suppose the initial equilibrium set of tariﬀs was (τo[n];0), which corresponds to the
striped area at the bottom of Figure 4. In this case a reduction of costs improves the
compliance of Home, who switches from playing τo[n] to playing τi[γ,n], while Foreign’s
tariﬀ remains at zero. Thus, the reduction of litigation costs may succeed in forcing countries
into compliance by rendering retaliation more attractive. Note that this intuitive eﬀect only
occurs for oﬀenders being smaller than their victims (i.e. n ≤ 1).
3.5 Key Findings of the Basic Model
The model’s predictions suggest that the current DSS does not succeed in protecting small
countries’ trade interests against large countries’ oﬀenses. One may call this an institutional
bias of the system.
Moreover, a reduction of litigation costs has been found to improve small countries’
compliance, while it entices even more large countries than before to commit major oﬀenses.
Consequently, large countries’ trade interests would be protected even better from small
countries’ oﬀenses, while small countries would suﬀer from more severe oﬀenses than before.
Hence, a subsidization of litigation costs is supposed to worsen the system’s institutional
bias.
4 Extension
4.1 Rationale and Model Adaptations
In order to analyze if the results of the ﬁrst model are robust to variations, this subsection
models the asymmetry of the two countries in a diﬀerent way, while the structure of the
39The reduction of litigation costs initially aﬀects Foreign’s decision by lowering the tolerated level of violation
(i.e. lowering τi[γ,n]). Consequently, Home’s opportunity costs of a minor oﬀense increase since the gap between
its optimal tariﬀ τo[n] and the retaliation threshold widens. At some point the welfare gain, which is associated
with this tariﬀ gap, exceeds the welfare loss that would arise in the course of provoked retaliation. If litigation
costs are reduced below that point, Home will switch from committing a minor oﬀense to committing a major
oﬀense.
21analysis remains unchanged. Throughout this section the emphasis is put on highlighting
the crucial diﬀerences that result from the changed speciﬁcations.
Suppose the representative consumers’ quasilinear utility functions were identical in both
countries.40 Suppose further that Foreign has one consumer while Home has n identical
consumers. Consequently demand at Home is n times foreign demand in both sectors.
Demand at Home is then given by:
Dx[px] := (a − bpx)n (24)
Dy[py] := (a − bpy)n (25)
Foreign’s demand is given by:
D∗
x[px] := a − bpx (26)
D∗
y[py] := a − bpy (27)
Again Foreign supplies only good x while Home supplies only good y.
S∗
x[px] := bpx (28)
Sy[py] := bpy (29)
Equilibrium prices, quantities, welfare levels and optimal tariﬀs are obtained in an analogous
manner to the calculations conducted in the ﬁrst model. However, unlike before, Foreign’s
welfare in sector y, which is denoted by ˆ w∗
y[τ∗
o,n], has become a function of the country size
ratio n. Consequently Foreign’s optimal tariﬀ τ∗
o[n] has become a function of n as well. It
is given by: τ∗
o[n] = a
b(3+4n+n2). Note that Foreign’s optimal tariﬀ now clearly decreases in
n, since Foreign’s ability to inﬂuence world market prices and hence its ability to generate
terms of trade gains deteriorates with increasing n.
The rules of the tariﬀ setting game and the modeling of the WTO’s Equivalence Condition
remain unchanged.
40Let utility for a representative consumer be given by: U[x,y,z] = U









Again trade is balanced via the numeraire good z.
224.2 The Second Mover’s Equilibrium Strategy
4.2.1 The Optimal Retaliative Tariﬀ
Again Foreign’s welfare is a continuous function of its import tariﬀ τ∗, which is positive
and strictly increasing on the interval between zero and τ∗
o[n] for n < ∞. Thus, Foreign’s
retaliative tariﬀ τ∗
r is given by τ∗
r [τ,n] = min{τ∗
o[n],τ∗
eq[τ,n]}.
4.2.2 To Retaliate or not to Retaliate
Necessary Condition for Retaliation
Litigation costs are prohibitive if c ≥ ˆ w∗
y[τ∗
o[n]] − ˆ w∗
y[0] is satisﬁed. Substituting explicit
values for ˆ w∗
y[τ∗
o[n]] and ˆ w∗
y[0] yields prohibitive costs cp as a function of n:
cp[np] =
a2
2b(2 + np)2(3 + 4np + n2
p)
(30)
The subscript p is appended to the country size parameter n in order to be able to identify
the cases where costs are prohibitive in terms of country size.41 Equation 30 reveals that an
increase in litigation costs leads to a decrease of the threshold where costs have a prohibitive
eﬀect in terms of country size (i.e.
∂cp[np]
∂np < 0). Since cp[np] is a continuous and monotoni-
cally decreasing function, it holds that n < np is a necessary condition for retaliation.42
Suﬃcient Condition for Retaliation
Foreign will only retaliate if the welfare gain associated with the implementation of its re-
taliative tariﬀ τ∗
r [τ,n] exceeds litigation costs. Thus there will be a vector of combinations
of τ, n and np which leads Foreign to be indiﬀerent between retaliating and not retaliating.
The set of these indiﬀerence inducing combinations can be found in terms of Home’s tariﬀ
τ. The resulting tariﬀ τi[np,n] is again a function of costs (already expressed in terms of
41If e.g. np = 2 Foreign would not complain against oﬀenses committed by countries of size n ≥ 2, no matter
how severe the oﬀenses may be.
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hook-shaped τi[np,n]-curve only runs up to the level of n where n = np, since τi[np,n] does
not exist for prohibitive costs (i.e. n ≥ np). This indiﬀerence curve separates the n-τ-space
into two diﬀerent strategic sections. Combinations of τ and n lying to the southwest (i.e.
low τ and low n) or to the east (i.e. n ≥ np) of the curve will not trigger foreign retaliation,
whereas combinations of τ and n lying above the curve will trigger foreign retaliation.
The bold downward sloping curve labeled τ[n] represents all combinations in the n-τ-
space where the permitted retaliative tariﬀ τ∗
eq[τ,n] equals Foreign’s optimal tariﬀ τ∗
o[n].43
Economically this means that Foreign’s retaliation is inelastic in Home’s initial violation for
combinations of n and τ that lie above the τ[n]-curve, since Foreign will never retaliate with
a tariﬀ that is higher than its optimal tariﬀ.
43Analytically τ[n] is found by setting τ
∗
eq[τ,n] equal to τ
∗
o[n] and solving for τ.
244.3 The First Mover’s Equilibrium Strategy
4.3.1 General Considerations
The perfectly informed Home country decides between committing a minor oﬀense (i.e.
τ ≤ τi[np,n]), which does not trigger retaliation, and a major oﬀense (i.e. τ > τi[np,n]),
which does trigger retaliation.44
Similarly to the calculations in the ﬁrst model it can be shown to hold as well in this
model that it does not pay for a country to commit a major oﬀense against a larger country.45
4.3.2 Identifying Sets of Dominated Strategies
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44Note that now τi[np,n] does not exist for n > np, since costs are prohibitive in these cases. Therefore it seems
reasonable to count as well those violative tariﬀs as major oﬀenses, where Home plays its optimal tariﬀ because
costs are prohibitive.









eq[τ,n]} into Home’s welfare function:




















o[n]) can be ruled out to occur for n ≤ 1.
25I. Clearly all tariﬀs above the optimal tariﬀ are strictly dominated by setting the optimal
tariﬀ.
II. Moreover, all tariﬀs below τi[np,n] are dominated by setting a tariﬀ of min{τo[n],τi[np,n]}.
III. Combinations of n and τ that lie within the wedge shaped area to the right of point B
are strictly dominated by setting the optimal tariﬀ.
Best Response for n ≤ 1
Since it does not pay for a Home country of size smaller than unity to commit a major
oﬀense, Home’s choice will be a tariﬀ τ ≤ τi[np,n]. As Figure 6 shows there is again the
opportunity for Home to play its optimal tariﬀ τo[n] without triggering retaliation as long
as Home is smaller than noi[np]. Home countries of greater size, but still smaller than unity
will play τi[np,n] in order not to trigger retaliation.46 This lower switching point noi[np] can




Best Response for n > 1
If Home is larger than Foreign, the best response function again consists of three possible
tariﬀs which have not yet been shown to be dominated by another tariﬀ. Similar to the ﬁrst
model the three remaining sets of Home’s tariﬀs are
1. its optimal tariﬀ τo[n],
2. the current retaliation threshold τi[np,n] and
3. τma[n] lying in between τi[np,n] and τ[n].
Assuming non prohibitive costs, the point nio[np] where Home switches from committing a
minor oﬀense to committing a major oﬀense can be derived along the lines of the calculations
in the previous model.48 The paradoxical result that a reduction of litigation costs may
46Mathematically the fundamental diﬀerence between the simple model and the current variation of the model
lies in the fact there may be either (i) no switching point at all (this applies for values where np < 0.897) or (ii) a
single switching point (this applies for values where np > 1) or (iii) two switching points (this applies for values
where 0.897 ≤ np ≤ 1). In the case of two switching points Home would actually switch its strategy twice with
increasing n from zero to unity (ﬁrst from τo[n] to τi[np,n] and then back to τo[n]).
47This property can be shown to hold in an analogous manner to the proceedings of the Mathematical Appendix
6.4.
48Again the switching points between the three sections of Home’s best response function are obtained by
substituting Home’s three possible oﬀensive tariﬀs and Foreign’s associated retaliative tariﬀs pairwise into Home’s
26lead even smaller countries than before to committing a major oﬀense holds as well in this
model.49 Just like before nio[np] is bounded above (at n = 1.6025) and below (at n = 1.2128)
at absolute levels of country size, while it is cost-elastic only between these boundaries.
Consequently, countries of size n ≤ 1.2128 will never play τo[n], countries of size n > 1.6025
will always play τo[n], while countries of size 1.2128 < n ≤ 1.6025 will play either τo[n] or
τi[np,n] depending upon the pertinent level of litigation costs.50
4.4 Equilibria
Figure 7 shows the occurrence of three diﬀerent subgame perfect Nash equilibrium tariﬀ
pairs (ˆ τ; ˆ τ∗) in the np-n-space.51 The diagonal line starting at the origin, has a slope of one.
It divides the np-n-space into one upper triangular shaped set, where n > np holds and one
lower triangular shaped set, where n < np holds. Clearly all np-n-combinations in the upper
set exhibit prohibitive costs, such that the equilibrium in the upper triangular is given by
(τo[n];0)). This tariﬀ pair constitutes as well an equilibrium in the striped area lying below
the 45-degree line and below the noi[np]-curve. Although costs are not prohibitive in this
area, the oﬀense and therefore the permitted level of retaliation is not large enough to let
Foreign break even with litigation costs.
The white area represents all combinations of np and n leading to an equilibrium tariﬀ
pair of (τi[np,n];0). This area is bordered below by noi[np], above by nio[np] and to the left
by the condition of non-prohibitive costs (i.e. the 45-degree line).
welfare function. The three resulting welfare functions of Home are given by:
1. ˆ wo[n] = ˆ wx[τo[n],n] + ˆ wy[τ
∗
o[n],n],
2. ˆ wi[np,n] = ˆ wx[τi[np,n],n] + ˆ wy[0,n] and
3. ˆ wma[n] = ˆ wx[τma[n],n] + ˆ wy[τ
∗
eq[τma[n],n],n].
These welfare functions are set equal to each other in a pairwise fashion. Solving for n then yields either an
absolute value of n at the switching point or the value of n at the switching point as a function of np respectively.
Setting ˆ wo[n] equal to ˆ wma[n] yields the absolute value of n for which Home is indiﬀerent between playing τo[n]
and τma[n]. Its value is n = 1.2128. The values of n where Home is indiﬀerent between playing τi[np,n] on the one
hand and playing τo[n] or τma[n] on the other hand clearly have to depend upon costs and country size. Therefore
the switching point nio[np] is again obtained by setting ˆ wi[np,n] equal to ˆ wo[n] and solving this expression for n.
49Formally,
∂nio[np]
∂np < 0 can be shown to hold in this model.
50Again playing τma[n] will be dominated by playing one of the other two tariﬀs except for the occurrence of
a very narrow range of country size ratios and costs. Consequently further analysis of this option is omitted for
the same reasons as in the previous model. For the sake of completeness it can be shown that the Home will only
play τma[n] if it holds both that np ≥ 3.7480 and 1 < n ≤ 1.2128.
51Recall that a high (low) level of np corresponds to a low (high) level of litigation costs.
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The upper grey area represents a trade war equilibrium with both countries playing
their optimal tariﬀs. It is bordered below by nio[np] and to the left by the condition of
non-prohibitive costs.
4.5 Comparative Statics in Litigation Costs
Again one has to distinguish between a cost reduction that passes the threshold of prohibitive
costs and a cost reduction that occurs within the set of non-prohibitive costs.
4.5.1 Prohibitive Initial Costs
Consider the case where litigation costs are reduced from an initially prohibitive level (i.e.
n ≥ np) to a level lying an increment below this threshold. Then, similar to the ﬁndings
of the ﬁrst model, the consequences of the cost reduction depend upon the country size
ratio. For large values of n the cost reduction triggers a trade war (i.e. (τo[n];τ∗
o[n])). For
intermediate values of n the cost reduction improves compliance (i.e. (τi[np,n];0)), and for
low values of n the post shock tariﬀ pair coincides with the initial tariﬀ pair (i.e. (τo[n];0)).
284.5.2 Non-prohibitive Initial Costs
Now consider the case where initial non-prohibitive litigation costs (i.e. n < np) are further
reduced.
For high values of n, where the initial equilibrium is a trade war (i.e. (τo[n];τ∗
o[n])), the
cost reduction has no eﬀect and the initial equilibrium does not change.
For intermediate values of n, where the initial equilibrium is (τi[np,n];0), the eﬀects of
a reduction of litigation costs depend even further on the country size ratio. If n ≤ 1.2128,
the cost reduction does not change the equilibrium strategy. If n > 1.2128, a cost reduction
may change the equilibrium in a paradoxical way, just as in the basic model.
Finally, if the initial set of tariﬀs is (τo[n];0), which corresponds to the striped area to the
right of the 45-degree line, a cost reduction improves the compliance of Home, who switches
from playing τo[n] to playing τi[np,n], while Foreign’s tariﬀ remains at zero.
4.6 Key Findings of the Extended Model
While the basic model includes market power only in Home’s oﬀensive sector (i.e. its import
sector), the extension includes market power in both Home’s oﬀensive (import) and Home’s
defensive (export) sector. Moreover, it is constructed such that the answer to the question
whether a particular level of litigation costs is prohibitive or not, depends upon the country
size ratio.
Despite these diﬀerences, the results of the basic model have been shown to be qualita-
tively robust to the conducted change in the model’s speciﬁcations.
In particular, a subsidization of litigation costs has been shown to worsen the system’s
bias as well under the alternative assumptions of the model extension.
5 Conclusion
The outcomes of both models suggest that the DSS is unable to level out existing power
imbalances between countries and therefore does not provide equality before the law. This
ﬁnding is based on the fact that a country’s ability to enforce a trade agreement under the
rules of the DSS depends crucially upon the country’s retaliative capacity, which in turn is
29country speciﬁc. Moreover, litigation costs have been found to be a key determinant of a
violated country’s decision whether or not to ﬁle a complaint. Since several DSS experts argue
that litigation costs are supposed to be higher for developing countries than for developed
countries, the former may face not only a disadvantage in terms of retaliative capacity but
as well in terms of absolute litigation costs.52
The results have been employed to analyze the eﬀects of a reduction of litigation costs.
The ﬁndings suggest that a reduction of litigation costs succeeds in improving smaller coun-
tries’ compliance, while it entices larger countries to commit more severe oﬀenses.53 Thus,
a subsidization of litigation costs is supposed to make smaller countries even worse oﬀ than
before, while large countries would enjoy a better protection of their trade interests against
smaller countries.
Besides, a reduction of litigation costs is supposed to lead to more trade disputes surfacing
in the dispute settlement record and cause an increase in the implementation of retaliation
at the same time.
Another result of the model is related to the question whether or not the usage of the
dispute settlement system is biased. The theoretical model predicts that a country is more
likely to ﬁle a complaint if it (i) has a relatively high retaliative capacity, (ii) faces low litiga-
tion costs and (iii) suﬀers from an oﬀense at a relatively high level. While these theoretical
ﬁndings may explain the dominance of rich countries in the dispute settlement record, they
mean at the same time that the observable sample of reported disputes is biased in favor of
countries with these particular characteristics. Therefore, the ﬁnding of [Horn et al., 1999],
which suggests that disputes occur randomly and reasonably proportional to the number
of a country’s product-market-pairings, may still be correct. However, in the light of the
model at hand, the number of a country’s product-market-pairings should no longer be seen
as the central reason for the occurrence of a dispute, but rather as a side eﬀect, that may be
positively correlated with the real drivers of oﬀenses and complaints which are a country’s
52See [Bown, 2005] and [Nordstr¨ om, 2005]. One reason for their ﬁnding is the fact that many developed countries
have already sunk their litigation costs by running a permanent mission at Geneva, while developing countries
face variable costs since they would have to hire law ﬁrms and consulting ﬁrms in order to prepare a complaint.
Another reason may be the developing countries’ fear of a loss of political goodwill, which could as well be seen
as a component of litigation costs.
53This result parallels ﬁndings of the Economics of Crime literature. See for example [Becker, 1968], who shows
that a reduction in litigation costs may lead some oﬀenders to switch to more severe oﬀenses, while it may reduce
the oﬀensive level of others.
30retaliative capacity, litigation costs and the intensity of violation. Hence the theory suggests
that the observable sample of disputes does not reﬂect the country-speciﬁc characteristics
of the unobservable population of disputes. Therefore the unreported oﬀenses (i.e. the dark
ﬁgure of oﬀenses) should contain a disproportionately large share of countries lacking retalia-
tive capacity, facing high litigation costs and being oﬀended against at lower intensity. This
typically applies for developing countries.
Finally, the model seems to provide a theoretical foundation for some existing empirical
studies. The model’s predictions agree with the empirical ﬁndings of [Bown, 2005], who con-
cludes on page 16: “Our formal evidence indicates that, despite market access interests in a
dispute, an exporting country is less likely to participate in WTO litigation if it has inadequate
power for trade retaliation, if it is poor and does not have the capacity to absorb substantial
legal costs, if it is particularly reliant on the respondent country for bilateral assistance, or is
engaged with the respondent in a preferential trade agreement. These are characteristics typ-
ically associated with developing countries in the WTO membership.” The empirical study of
[Guzman and Simmons, 2005] supports the results as well. [Guzman and Simmons, 2005],
page 591 ﬁnd that “...developing countries are using the DSU in a way that reﬂects their
current incapacity to launch eﬀective legal cases against potential trade law violators.”.
316 Mathematical Appendix
6.1 Equilibrium Prices
Equilibrium world market prices as functions of the associated import tariﬀs are given by:
ˆ px[τ] =
a + an − bnτ
2b + bn






6.2 Properties of the Aggregated Welfare Functions





n(an − 4b(1 + n)τ)
(2 + n)2 > 0
This condition is satisﬁed if the numerator is positive (i.e. if n(an − 4b(1 + n)τ) > 0 holds).
Solving this expression for τ yields τ < an




< 0 ⇔ −
4bn(1 + n)
(2 + n)2 < 0
This condition is always satisﬁed.
A country’s welfare is decreasing in the other country’s tariﬀ if it holds that:
∂ ˆ w[τ,τ∗,n]




This condition is satisﬁed if it holds that τ∗ < a
2b, where a
2b is the prohibitive level of τ∗,
meaning that the traded amount of good y would equal zero under such a high tariﬀ.
326.3 Properties of τma[n]
Aggregated welfare at Home in case of a major oﬀense is given by:
ˆ w[τ,n] = ˆ wx[τ,n] + ˆ wy[min{τ∗
eq[τ,n],τ∗
o}]
For the cases where permitted retaliation has already reached τ∗
o, the maximization of ˆ w[τ,n]
yields again Home’s optimal tariﬀ τo[n] since τ∗
o is independent of τ. Therefore the optimal
tariﬀ remains unchanged, while welfare at Home is reduced by a ﬁxed amount.
For the case of ﬂexible retaliation (i.e. τ∗
eq[τ,n] ≤ τ∗
o) Home’s welfare from a major oﬀense
is:
ˆ w[τ,n] =
a2(140 + 176n + 35n2)
72b(2 + n)2
−
72b2n(2 + n)τ2 − 3a(2 + n)(12bnτ +
p
25a2(2 + n)2 − 72abn(2 + 3n)τ + 144b2n2τ2)
72b(2 + n)2




3an(a(2 + 3n) − 4bnτ)
2(2 + n)
p




25a2(2 + n)2 − 72abn(2 + 3n)τ + 144b2n2τ2
2(2 + n)
p
25a2(2 + n)2 − 72abn(2 + 3n)τ + 144b2n2τ2
Setting this expression equal to zero and solving for τ yields a polynomial of degree eight in
n. After having applied a Taylor Series expansion of degree four around the value n = 1, the















The positive real roots of the polynomial are n1 = 1 and n2 = 4.01578. Obviously it holds
that τma[n] = 0∀n = 1.
∂τma[n]
∂n is positive at n1 = 1 and negative at n2 = 4.01578. This means that τma[n] is
crossing the zero line from below at n1 = 1 and from above at n2 = 4.01578. Hence τma[n]
must be positive between unity and n2 and negative for values of n which are either smaller
than unity or larger than n2.
336.4 Properties of the lower switching point noi[γ]
noi[γ] is the country size ratio where the ﬁrst mover switches from playing τo[n] to playing
τi[γ,n]. It is found by setting them equal to each other and solving for n. The polynomial
has only one positive real root. It takes on the value 1 for γ = 1 and the value 0 for γ = 0.
The local Taylor approximation of noi[γ] at a particular value of γ, with 0 < γ < 1, is strictly
increasing in γ. In other words, locally (0 < n < 1, 0 < γ < 1) it holds that
∂noi[γ]
∂γ > 0.
6.5 Properties of ˆ wo[n]
Substituting Home’s optimal tariﬀ into its welfare function in sector x, substituting Foreign’s
optimal tariﬀ in to Home’s welfare in sector y and adding them together yields:
ˆ wo[n] := ˆ wx[τo[n],n] + ˆ wy[τ∗
o]















6.6 Identifying the Area where ˆ wma[n] is preferred
The country size at the intersection of ˆ wma[n] and ˆ wo[n] is found by subracting ˆ wma[n] from
ˆ wo[n], setting this diﬀerence equal to zero and solving for n. Since ˆ wma[n], and consequently
the diﬀerence between the two welfare functions, is a polynomial of degree eight, the regula
falsi method is employed to ﬁnd the real and positive root of this expression.





holds locally at n = 1.40231, welfare from ˆ wma[n] will be higher (lower) than welfare from
ˆ wo[n] iﬀ n < 1.40231 (n > 1.40231) holds. Therefore, a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the ﬁrst mover to prefer playing τma[n] over τo[n] is that 1 < n < 1.40231 holds.
Given this necessary and suﬃcient condition holds, it still depends on the actual level
34of costs whether it is preferred to play τma[n] or τi[γ,n] in this interval. The intersection
of ˆ wma[n] and ˆ wi[γ,n] at the point where n = 1.40231 can be solved for a cost level of
γ = 0.03086. Speaking graphically, litigation costs have to be lower than 0.03086 to shift the
ˆ wi[γ,n]-curve so much downward that its intercept with the ˆ wma[n]-curve lies in the interval
of 1 < n < 1.40231. Therefore, a necessary condition for the ﬁrst mover to prefer playing
τma[n] over τi[γ,n] is that 0 < γ < 0.03086 holds.
6.7 Properties of the higher switching point nio[γ]
nio[γ] is the country size ratio where the ﬁrst mover switches from playing τi[γ,n] to playing
τo[n]. It is found by setting the two corresponding welfare functions equal to each other
and solving for n. The resulting polynomial has eight roots, meaning that there are eight
intersections of ˆ wo[n] and ˆ wi[γ,n]. Four of them are complex, and four are real. The only
root that is positive and real for n > 1 (two other real roots are globally negative. Another
real root is positive, but globally smaller than unity.54) is therefore nio[γ]. It takes on the
value 2.46187 for γ = 1 and the value 1.38504 for γ = 0. The local Taylor approximation of
nio[γ] at a particular value of γ, with 0 < γ < 1, is strictly increasing in γ. In other words,
locally (1.38504 < n < 2.46187, 0 < γ < 1) it holds that
∂nio[γ]
∂γ > 0.
54This positive real root, being smaller than unity, coincides with the lower switching point noi[γ]. This is due
to the fact that welfare from both playing τo[n] and playing τi[γ,n] always has to coincide in noi[γ] because the
associated tariﬀs themselves are identical, and both do not trigger any retaliation at noi[γ].
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